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Abstract 
Aims: To summarise the substantive findings of studies of alcohol industry involvement in 
national or supra-national policy-making, and to produce a new synthesis of current 
evidence.  
Methods: This study examined peer-reviewed journal reports published in the English 
language between 1980-2016 of studies of alcohol industry involvement in policy making. 
Included studies were required to provide information on data collection and analysis and to 
have sought explicitly to investigate interventions by alcohol industry actors within the 
process of public policy making.  Eight electronic databases were searched on 27/02/17.  
The methodological strengths and limitations of individual studies and the literature as a 
whole were examined. A thematic synthesis using an inductive approach to the generation 
of themes was guided by the research aims and objectives.  
Results: Twenty reports drawn from 15 documentary and interview studies identify 
pervasive influence of alcohol industry actors in policy making. This evidence synthesis 
indicates that industry actors seek to influence policy in two principal ways: 1) by framing 
policy debates in a cogent and internally consistent manner, which excludes from policy 
agendas issues that are contrary to commercial interests; and 2) by adopting short and long 
term approaches to managing threats to commercial interests within the policy arena, by 
building relationships with key actors using a variety of different organisational forms. This 
review pools findings from existing studies on the range of observed impacts on national 
alcohol policy decision-making across the world. 
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Conclusions: Alcohol industry actors are highly strategic, rhetorically sophisticated and well 
organised in influencing national policy-making. 
 
The policies regarded by the research community as most likely to be effective in reducing 
alcohol harms are those which regulate the behaviour of industry actors; such as controlling 
the availability and increasing prices of alcohol (1). These policy measures place significant 
constraints on business practices. By contrast, dedicated national alcohol policies frequently 
appear to reflect the preferences of alcohol industry actors (2-4).  They tend to afford 
considerable scope for industry self-regulation and promote non-regulatory measures,  
eschewing effective population level policy measures which address the alcogenic 
environment created by the commercial activities of corporate actors (5).  
Studies in other policy areas such as tobacco control or environmental protection have 
identified a range of corporate political activities designed to shape policy, including 
attempts, for example, to shape the evidentiary content of policy debates (6-9).  The 
research literature examining alcohol industry policy influence appears to have emerged 
quite recently in response to the articulation of serious concerns by the research community 
(3, 10). Knowledge of the alcohol industry’s putative influence on policy could be 
strengthened with evidence from studies that investigate the involvement of industry actors 
in policy making. Although the need to undertake this kind of research has been identified in 
the field of public health (4, 11, 12), studies of the political activities of alcohol industry 
actors may also exist in other disciplines. Apart from one systematic review concerned with 
marketing regulation (13), no other evidence synthesis is known to have been undertaken 
on alcohol industry actors’ involvement in policy making. The existing systematic review 
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emphasised the similarities which exist with the tobacco industry in both the tactics used to 
influence policy, and the framing of arguments promoted to shape policy debates (13). The 
present study focuses on the ways in which alcohol industry actors are involved in policy-
making, and is not concerned with policy implementation, or with the outcomes of policy 
decisions. 
Methods 
This systematic review (14) examines only studies published in peer reviewed journals, as it 
is not judged possible to identify and appraise grey literature in an unbiased manner. For 
the purposes of this study, the alcohol industry is defined as economic actors involved in the 
production, distribution and marketing of alcohol (15) (regardless of whether this is the 
primary feature  of their business), as well as trade associations, and social aspects 
organisations (16). The aim of this systematic review is to investigate existing empirical 
evidence on alcohol industry actors’ involvement in policy-making. The study objectives are 
as follows: 
1. To summarise the substantive findings of existing studies; 
2. To assess the strengths and the limitations of existing research; 
3. To synthesise existing evidence across studies;   
4. To identify key gaps in current evidence. 
To be included in this review, studies should: 
 Be published in peer-reviewed journals during the period 1980-2016 
inclusive; 
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 Be published in the English language; 
 Explicitly seek to study (for example, as reflected in stated aims) 
interventions by alcohol industry actors within the process of public policy 
making; 
 Provide information on data collection and analysis processes in a 
dedicated methods section to enable an assessment of methodological 
strengths and limitations.  For reviews to be eligible they must search more 
than one database, have explicit selection criteria and report on all studies 
included (if not they were treated as discussion papers and excluded); 
 Present data on alcohol industry actors separately in studies of corporate 
activities across multiple sectors and/or of multiple actors within policy 
process; 
 Be concerned with policy at the national or supra-national levels. 
Commentaries, editorials, letters, discussion papers, and conceptual work on alcohol 
industry actors are excluded, including one integrative review of a set of primary studies 
included here (17). Excluded also are studies of industry activities not directly concerned 
with influencing policy, such as in relation to evidence production, corporate social 
responsibility, or the direct consequences of commercial activities such as marketing on 
public health. The earliest date is chosen to include data prior to the concentration of 
ownership of alcohol producers by a small number of global alcohol corporations which 
occurred since the 1990s (15). Data from studies of supra-national policy levels (e.g. 
European Union) are understood to be informative about national level political activities. 
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The sub-national policy level is excluded as it is anticipated that the nature of alcohol 
industry policy involvement may be importantly different, as suggested by an existing study 
at this level with a somewhat different focus (18). 
Literature search strategies were developed using Medical Subjects Headings (MeSH) terms 
and key word terms. Previous systematic reviews in related areas were consulted in 
iteratively developing both the search terms and the databases to be included. Eight 
different health and social science databases were searched: Web of Science Core 
Collection; BIOSIS Citation Index; SciELO Citation Index; CINAHL Plus; Embase; MEDLINE; 
PsycINFO; Scopus. The basic search strategy was organised around the three constructs of 
‘alcohol’, ‘industry’ and ‘policy’ (corporat* OR industr* OR compan* OR busines* OR ﬁrm*) 
AND (alcohol OR drink) AND (marketing OR advertis* OR sponsor*) AND (regulat* OR policy 
OR legislat*) and developed with the support of a specialist librarian. The search strategy for 
MEDLINE is presented in appendix 1. Searches were conducted on 27 February 2017. We did 
not register nor publish a protocol for this review. 
[SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX 1: MEDLINE SEARCH STRATEGY] 
The second author led data collection, identifying additional material in non-database 
searching including backwards and forwards citation searches, hand searching the special 
series on policy case studies and vested interests within this journal and contacting topic 
experts. Titles and abstracts were downloaded and imported to EndNote (where duplicates 
were removed). Titles (and abstracts if available) were screened, with 10% of all records 
checked by the first author.  Potentially eligible full texts were obtained, and eligibility of all 
material was determined by the first two authors by independently assessing papers against 
the selection criteria in excel, then discussing any disagreements. 
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A thematic analysis using an inductive approach to the generation of themes (19, 20) was 
guided by the review aims and objectives, mindful that this was an apples and oranges 
review of studies with diverse study designs and foci. This involved progression from stages 
of coding and summarising thematic material within the included studies to a final stage of 
going beyond the themes as they were reported (21). In approaching the analysis in this 
way, we thus decided at the outset to eschew the adoption of a pre-existing conceptual 
framework such as the one based on the tobacco industry used by Savell and colleagues 
(13). This approach was intended to produce a novel investigation of the extent of 
similarities with the tobacco industry and other themes that was complementary to that 
used by Savell and colleagues (13). In keeping with the handling of the substantive findings, 
and in preference to formal assessment of risk of bias, the methodological examination 
avoided the application of in-depth analytic techniques, with details being provided on data 
collection and analysis, alongside observations on study limitations.  
We began by reading all included reports, with the third author leading the  development 
and refinement of the initial thematic coding and extraction of material using direct capture 
of relevant text via cut and paste into tables in Microsoft Word . This was accompanied by a 
precis of key findings within each analytic category for all included reports (see 
Supplementary Appendix 2 for this dataset). In the next stage, the analysis moved from 
examination of relevant content within studies to the aggregation of themes across studies. 
The thematic summaries of data from primary studies are presented parsimoniously in 
Tables 2-4. The first and third authors worked closely together throughout this process. 
Following brief methodological characterisation of the literature, the narrative presentation 
in the Results section is primarily concerned with generating a novel synthesis.  
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 [SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX 2: DATA EXTRACTION] 
Results  
This review identified 20 reports drawn from 15 studies (treating each study as a discrete 
data collection exercise, with some generating multiple journal reports) as eligible for 
inclusion (see PRISMA flowchart in supplementary appendix 3). These were largely 
published since 2012 (6 reports (22-27) from 4 studies were earlier) and mostly concerned 
high income, English-speaking countries (7 UK [4 studies], 2 US [1 study], 2 Australia, 1 New 
Zealand) with other reports of studies undertaken in Africa (Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda and 
Botswana(26)), Hong Kong (28), Thailand (29) and Poland (30) respectively. All are 
qualitative studies with the exception of the Thai study (29) which largely presents 
quantitative data. There were 3 reports (2 studies) based on internal tobacco company 
documents (24, 25, 31) and one systematic review on influence of marketing regulation 
without a particular geographical focus (13). These reports were all published in addictions 
or public health journals, apart from 3 in policy and politics journals (32-34).  
[SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX 3: PRISMA FLOWCHART]  
[SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX 4: PRISMA CHECKLIST]  
INSERT TABLE 1 
Table 1 provides a summary of the characteristics of the included studies. Nine are solely 
documentary studies, 4 are case studies involving the presentation of a combination of 
documentary and other data sources, 2 are primarily interview studies, though both draw 
extensively on other data sources in the course of analyses.  
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Among the 6 non-documentary studies, 3 (the UK studies by Holden and colleagues (32, 34-
36) and Katikireddi and colleagues (37) and the US study by Giesbrecht and colleagues (22, 
23)) are carefully designed with detailed and rigorous attention to inference generation and 
transparently reported in studies generating multiple reports in the peer reviewed literature 
(see Table 1). These methodological strengths produce findings in which there can be a high 
degree of confidence. The other 3 (26, 29, 38) are more opportunistic in nature, with study 
conduct motivated by particular events yielding individual reports; one being a ‘smoking 
gun’ study, revealing industry actor authorship of draft national policy documents (26).  
Four (27, 39-41) of the 9 documentary studies examine public consultation submission data, 
2 analyse broader policy-related data sources (28, 30), 2 draw on tobacco company 
documents (24, 25, 31) and 1 reviews existing research literature (13). There are limitations 
to the nature and extent of the data available for study in all 4 studies (27, 39-41) of public 
consultation data (see Table 1). The most rigorously conducted and reported consultation 
submission study by Kypri and colleagues (40) has a limited focus on industry actors. 
Framing arguments 
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INSERT TABLE 2 
As can be seen in Table 2, framing has been extensively studied, and this synthesis identifies 
three main strands, not only to the content but also to the strategic use of arguments made 
by alcohol industry actors within policy making. Industry actors give a great deal of attention 
to how they themselves are regarded; they position themselves as vital stakeholders in 
policy debates and key partners to government in policy formulation and implementation. 
This positioning legitimates their interventions in policy debates, including their attempts to 
define the scale and nature of alcohol problems that policy measures should strive to 
address (see Table 2).  
Positions on alcohol harms are carefully articulated to subtly endorse societal and public 
health concerns, and at the same time play down the scale of the problems. Industry actors 
attempt to shift understandings of harms, and the appropriate policy responses, from a 
population-level understanding to one which places responsibility on individual consumers 
(and thus away from alcohol itself and industry commercial practices). This individual-level 
framing of the causes of alcohol harms, lends itself to a policy focus on a minority of 
drinkers. This depends on representations of “normal” drinking from which problematic 
behaviour is differentiated (see Table 2).  
The specific policy measures advocated by industry actors follow directly from these 
rhetorical foundations. Policy approaches which are concerned with addressing the drinking 
of the entire population are judged to be fundamentally misdirected, including policy 
measures that restrict the ability of industry actors to brand, advertise, sell and price their 
products. Preferable policies centre on partnership approaches with industry actors to 
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education and information provision, and target putative causes of problems among 
particular sub-populations (see Table 2).   
Rhetorical techniques include false dichotomies between opposed policies and industry 
favoured policies, as pursuing the former does not preclude governments from also 
pursuing the latter. Underpinning the industry framing of policy positions identified here are 
misleading claims about the effectiveness, and unintended consequences, of whole 
population measures and their supporting evidence-base, and about weaker data which is 
used to support preferred approaches. This does not prevent industry actors making strong 
rhetorical commitments to evidence based policy. This synthesis identifies that all three 
objects of framing (actors, the policy problem, policy positions) are logically and strategically 
inter-connected within an internally consistent, and mutually reinforcing, framing of the 
policy issues. Industry actors can make intuitively plausible, and highly nuanced, arguments  
that can  appear compelling  if they are allowed to go unchallenged. 
Influencing activities   
INSERT TABLE 3 
Table 3 summarises the available evidence in the research literature on the activities of 
industry actors within policy making. Studies demonstrate that alcohol industry actors seek 
to be involved in all stages of the policy making process including public consultations, 
parliamentary committees and working groups, and with all relevant policy actors including 
government ministers and political advisors, civil servants, officials and technical advisors, 
members of parliaments and other political representatives, as do other corporate actors 
(42). Evidence shows they are highly effective in gaining access to the policy making process.  
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The consistency of findings across the studies identified in Table 3 exists despite the studies 
examining different policy debates at different times and in different policy-making 
contexts. 
This synthesis identifies a key distinction can be made between what can be termed pro-
active or long-term, and re-active or short-term, influencing activities. Long term lobbying is 
designed to shape the wider policy environment, including the background assumptions 
about the nature and functions of policy, the roles of industry within the policy process, and 
the terms in which policy debates are conducted. The maintenance and reinforcement of 
the policy framings described above is central to long-term industry strategy. In addition, 
long term lobbying involves sustained efforts to build intimate, ongoing relationships with 
key policy actors and decision makers through frequent contacts and other forms of 
engagement. This normalises the involvement of industry actors in policy processes, helps 
keep unfavoured issues off policy agendas, mainly consolidating a favourable status quo, as 
well as providing a basis for reactive lobbying in response to specific policy debates or 
initiatives that do arise (see Table 3). Such reactive lobbying also offers opportunities to 
advance key discourses, though this is issue specific and designed to achieve specific policy 
objectives, often the avoidance of unfavourable forms of regulation. Short-term lobbying on 
particular issues at particular times has been the focus of much of the existing research. The 
key findings of this synthesis are thus to highlight the role of long-term as well as short-term 
approaches, the relationship of the former to framing, and the symbiosis between these 
elements in overall industry strategy.  
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This synthesis indicates that industry actors create and adapt different organisational forms 
to undertake these policy influencing activities ranging from longstanding forms of interest 
group representation whose histories span decades (e.g. trade associations) to ad hoc types 
of collaboration on specific issues, as required. Collaborations between industry actors 
recognise the benefits of negotiated, strong and unified positions on key issues. Industry 
actors, however, are highly pragmatic and adopt varied organisational forms and leadership 
arrangements across policy issues, between different countries and at different times.  
The evolution of social aspects organisations is particularly noteworthy given the claims they 
permit about independence from the industry in the context of the global concentration of 
production. Also because their public relations and framing functions extend beyond the 
immediate contexts of policy making.  Individual companies make their own decisions about 
their political strategies, with larger companies having more options to consider, including 
acting alone. Third-parties (i.e. from outside the alcohol industry) are also used to engage 
policy actors (see Table 3). Evidence suggests that adroit management of relationships 
between alcohol industry actors, and with other actors and industries, extends to great care 
being taken in rhetorical distancing from the tobacco industry, whilst carefully collaborating 
in some policy influencing activities, particularly where there is shared ownership of 
companies.  
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Effects on policy outcomes 
INSERT TABLE 4 
Table 4 summarises data from existing studies on the range of observed impacts on policy 
decision-making. The effects of both framing and long term lobbying are complex to study. 
The timing of any such evaluation study matters because, across countries, there are 
examples of persistence in industry activities over time being able to secure desired policy 
outcomes, even after early setbacks. The relative resource disadvantage of public health 
actors is implicated in this pattern (see Table 4). It would be misguided, therefore, to 
examine policy impacts in crude success/failure terms.   
Decisions at different stages of the policy process are not necessarily consistent, and can 
either favour, or go against, the interests of industry actors at different junctures (see Table 
4). There are examples of competition between industry actors largely shaped by how 
policies affect different businesses and/or sectors of the industry. Across the studies 
examined here industry actors, nonetheless, have long term, well co-ordinated and well 
resourced strategies to advance their interests. Industry strategies appear transportable 
across national contexts, but are adapted flexibly to local issues and conditions, meaning 
that they do not take precisely the same form in every country (see Table 4). Although 
alcohol industry interests may prevail against public health interests due to long term 
influence on the policy making environment, this does not mean that public health actors 
cannot, and have not, successfully challenged the framing and influencing activities of 
industry actors within the policy process. 
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Discussion  
The research literature on alcohol industry involvement in national policy making has grown 
rapidly in recent years. This synthesis suggests that the two principal ways industry actors 
seek to influence policy are as follows: 1) to frame the contents of policy debates in a cogent 
and internally consistent manner;  and 2) to adopt long-term as well as short-term 
approaches to managing threats to commercial interests that may arise within the policy 
arena by extensively building relationships with key actors, deploying resources in a variety 
of different organisational forms. Alcohol industry actors are thus highly strategic, 
rhetorically sophisticated and well organised and, for these reasons, present formidable 
competition to those seeking to reduce the societal and public health problems caused by 
alcohol.   
The strengths of this study include rigorous systematic procedures for data collection and 
analysis and transparent reporting. Some review limitations reflect the limitations of the 
primary literature. Existing studies capture data that is relatively accessible.  This is 
important because it is challenging to observe the exercise of influence in policy making 
(43). Without the aid of internal company documents, as have been available for tobacco 
companies, alcohol studies must use interview data to produce knowledge of what “working 
behind the scenes”(24) actually involves.  This means that existing knowledge at any point in 
time may only partially capture the phenomenon under study. This makes studies such as 
this one, where the totality of available evidence is examined before drawing conclusions, 
particularly valuable.  
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Existing studies are largely centred on policy controversies, and thus risk being more 
concerned with shorter term lobbying around specific events than with underlying 
processes that manifest themselves across national policy making contexts and over the 
longer term. The review included 7 reports from 4 discrete studies involving the current 
authors and reflexivity considerations suggest this presents a risk of giving too much weight 
to these studies. At the outset, it was unknown how far scholars in disciplines other than 
public health (e.g. political scientists) have investigated alcohol industry actor involvement 
in policy. This study identified only a small number of such studies (44, 45), which were 
ineligible for inclusion as they lacked methods sections. There is also a rich tradition of 
public health surveillance studies which lack methodological requirements but nonetheless 
contain valuable data on policy and politics, usually alongside data on commercial activities 
(see for example (2, 46)). The focus on policy making means that our findings in relation to 
framing, for example, omit studies of framing activities within the media, public relations or 
research rather than in policy per se (47-49). Also omitted are studies of the policy process 
lacking specific intent to study industry actors, or presenting required data (11, 50, 51). A 
further limitation of this review is that we did not undertake a formal risk of bias assessment 
of the included studies. 
It is appropriate to consider this study specifically in relation to the systematic review of 
alcohol industry attempts to influence marketing regulations (13) included here, whilst 
noting the risk of circularity. The two reviews examine largely different literatures due to 
differences in study designs, with only two primary studies (24, 26) included in both. 
Notwithstanding the differences in data sources and analytic methods used, there is a high 
degree of overlap in study findings. This is important because it strengthens the existing 
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evidence on the similarities in political strategy and tactics between the alcohol and tobacco 
industries. 
The existing literature is largely based on individual high income, Anglophone countries, and 
dedicated study of generalisability to other national contexts, particularly in low and middle 
income countries, is lacking. We do not, however, only need more of the same kinds of 
studies identifying political activities and analysing discursive strategies. There are few 
cross-national studies capable of illuminating precisely how industry actors adapt 
discursively and tactically to different institutional and cultural and policy contexts. Despite 
rhetorical efforts to differentiate alcohol companies from the tobacco industry, alcohol 
industry political strategies closely resemble, and are in some cases directly shaped by 
tobacco industry actors. This suggests that it will be advantageous to use what is known 
about the tobacco industry to inform alcohol industry research agendas.  
Future research needs to be ambitious to match the long term strategic character of 
industry actor involvement in policy, and to be vigilant for developments in political 
organisation, particularly as global concentration of production advances (52).  Interviews 
are particularly useful sources of data collection on lobbying and related issues. Research of 
a more historical nature can address how industry actors develop their strategies over time, 
and address questions of how and why particular strategies are pursued. For example, why 
did social aspects organisations begin proliferating when they did, and how are these 
developments shaped by the changing structure of the industry? This particular example 
draws attention to the currently limited consideration of the commercial interests 
underlying policy preferences, and developing understanding rooted in political economy 
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(53) should help rectify this, as will integrating the emerging evidence-base across corporate 
sectors (4). 
Further research may also recognise that industry actors are one type of policy actor, and 
there is a need to situate them in relation to other actors within policy analytic studies. 
Likewise, keeping issues off the policy agenda is at least as important as delaying their 
progress, or shaping their specific content and direction, once issues become identified as 
policy problems, hence the need for study of long term strategies.  The framing of alcohol 
policy issues is in turn likely to be contingent on wider discourses about the rights of 
national governments to intervene in the lives of citizens, the functioning of the market 
economy, the power of transnational corporations and where responsibilities lie for societal 
and public health problems.  
Evidence indicates that alcohol industry actors are involved in policy making strategically to 
advance commercial interests, and this review builds on previous findings across policy 
issues, across time, and across the world. We suggest that notwithstanding advances in 
understanding already made, this subject has been grossly under-studied given the 
importance to global health and the likely value of more advanced understanding of these 
issues. This study offers ideas for future directions in research on the basis of what is 
already known and presents the evidence currently available that can be used tolimit the 
deleterious effects of the alcohol industry on population health and societal outcomes. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of included studies 
 Study aims and review-level observations 
on strengths of findings  
 
Review-level summary of data 
collection and analysis details 
Review-level observations on study 
limitations 
Greenfield et al. 2004 
(23); Giesbrecht et al. 
2004 (22)* 
 
This interview study draws on documentary 
data to investigate the U.S. policy process 
and the handling of specific policy issues. 
There are important findings on industry 
arguments, political organisation, and 
influencing tactics (e.g. financial donations 
and lobbying) subsequently replicated, and 
also key data on policy processes, for 
example the dynamics of the US federal 
policy system, that have not yet been further 
studied.  
Uses a rigorous two stage sampling 
approach to recruit multiple actor 
types involved in policy making and 
obtains an impressive response rate in 
a large sample (n=64). Detailed 
theoretically-based, analytic 
procedures are described. These are 
linked to the analytic categories and 
validity issues are explicitly 
considered.  Team analysis. 
Few details of how interviews were 
conducted in included reports. The 
difficulty of getting industry 
respondents to talk about policy 
dynamics is noted. Use made of 
documentary/archival data in the 
analysis somewhat unclear in included 
reports. 
 
Bond et al. 2009 (24); 
Bond et al. 2010 (25) 
 
 
This study of internal tobacco company 
documents takes advantage of Phillip Morris 
ownership of Miller Brewing Company to 
provide “smoking gun” data on a range of 
key issues. It clearly identifies common 
policy concerns across tobacco and alcohol 
sectors. Policy issues are identified as key 
business risks globally, leading to an 
intention “to fight aggressively, with all 
available resources” by “working behind the 
scenes” through “a joint defence strategy” 
Uses searching guidance for tobacco 
documents, identifying first 22 then 
increasing to 29 documents in the later 
paper on alcohol industry issues. Data 
unquestionably very strong. Thematic 
and content analyses are undertaken, 
though few details provided. 
 
Difficult to assess whether there may 
be other documents that have been 
missed. It may be possible to question 
external (i.e. generalizability to other 
actors) rather than internal validity. 
Later inclusion and coverage of 
Reynolds is somewhat unclear. 
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with other alcohol industry actors and 
external lobbyists. 
Bakke & Endal 2010 
(26) 
 
This study uses documentary data along with 
external data in the manner of a case study 
resulted from the chance discovery of 
software confirmed industry authorship of 
draft national alcohol policy documents in 4 
African countries. Safer drinking for the 
entire population was emphasized despite 
3/4  being non-drinkers, and industry 
preferred policies proposed. The industry 
actor also sought to institutionalise their 
participation in the processes of monitoring 
and reviewing resulting policies. This is 
another “smoking gun” study. 
Detailed textual comparisons of policy 
documents used. No methodological 
details provided for workshop and 
other data. 
 
 
It is unclear what impacts industry 
involvement in drafting these 
documents had on the subsequent 
final policies, or if conduct of this study 
impacted on policy decision-making. 
The nature of the unpublished 
observational, interview and e-mail 
correspondence data used, and their 
analysis, are also unclear. 
Miller  et al. 2011 (27) 
 
This is a documentary study of alcohol 
industry actor submissions to an Australian 
public consultation on prevention and health 
and the extent to which they promoted 
Drinkwise, a social aspects organisation, to 
demonstrate corporate social responsibility. 
Promotion of Drinkwise in all industry 
submissions is identified. 
The dataset comprises 9 industry 
submissions out of a total of 33 
relevant to alcohol. Thematic analyses 
were undertaken. The dataset is 
modest and the reported findings stick 
appropriately close to it.  
There are few details provided of the 
conduct of the analyses. The study 
focus is somewhat narrow and the 
resulting dataset small. 
 
Yoon & Lam 2012 (28) 
 
This documentary study examines the policy 
debate over a zero beer and wine tax in 
Hong Kong. Over an 8 year period industry 
actors came to coherently organise lobbying 
efforts to connect with key politicians. The 
importance of ideas in the evolution of the 
debates and the weak nature of public 
health advocacy in so doing are also 
Alcohol and related industry material, 
media reports and government data 
sources are examined. 97 documents 
were thematically analysed. First 
author did the analyses. 
 
Examples of key search terms only are 
given, and similarly, indicative types of 
documents provided. It is thus unclear 
whether informative documents that 
would change study findings may have 
been missed. Few details of analytic 
methods are provided. 
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emphasised. 
Holden et al.  2012 
(35); Holden and 
Hawkins 2012 (32); 
Hawkins & Holden 
2013 (34); Hawkins & 
Holden 2014 (33) 
 
This interview study is reported in a series of 
papers which collectively offer an extensive 
and coherent account of industry wide 
organisation, policy framing, political 
strategy and engagement with policy makers 
in relation to alcohol pricing in the UK during 
a period of policy controversy. Comparative 
analysis of Scotland and England was 
incorporated in study design. 
Stakeholder analysis to identify 
interviewees via purposive and 
subsequent snowball sampling. High 
level of access to industry actors. 
Triangulation between interview 
respondents (industry and non-
industry actors) as well as with 
documents/external data sources. Two 
authors involved in theoretically based 
analyses. Data saturation considered.  
Low levels of participation by 
governmental actors. Possible 
limitations in novel use of interview 
alongside documentary data for 
undertaking framing analyses. 
Variability in depth of insights across 
objects of study. 
Jiang and Ling 
2013(31) 
 
This study of internal tobacco company 
documents aimed to study alliances 
between tobacco and alcohol industries in 
the US in 1980s and 1990s. It specifies three 
main policy areas of collaboration, (tax, air 
pollution and advertising) , the industry 
actors involved and the organisational 
vehicles created or used for this purpose. It 
identifies the importance of co-ownership in 
the identification of common interests, 
strategies and coalition building.  
Examples of the search terms used are 
given. Extensive use is made of memos 
in analyzing the documents though it is 
not clear how documents have been 
selected. The numbers of documents 
examined are reported by issue rather 
than overall. 
 
 
It is unclear which actors have been 
investigated and thus what may have 
been missed. The scope of this study, 
including examination of effects, is 
more focused on tobacco control than 
alcohol policy. 
 
 
McCambridge et al.  
2013 (39) 
 
This documentary study examines the use of 
evidence in alcohol industry actor 
submissions to a Scottish public consultation 
on population-level policy measures that 
were strongly opposed by industry actors. 
Misrepresentations of the international 
scientific evidence on alcohol policies are 
identified along with other tactics in 
The study uses extensive direct 
quotation and provides access to 27 
submission documents by industry 
actors. Analyses involved comparisons 
with the international scientific 
evidence-base and gave weight to the 
frequency and prominence of 
evidential claims. 
The dataset is large and it is not clear 
whether additional findings may have 
been missed. There is limited detail 
provided of the conduct of the 
analyses.  
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evidence use.  
Hawkins & 
McCambridge 2014 
(38) 
 
This case study examined how a global 
producer funded a respected think tank to 
produce reports at crucial stages in the 
development of the UK government’s 
alcohol strategy. The tactics used to promote 
industry interests were similar to those used 
by transnational tobacco corporations, 
particularly using other, apparently 
independent actors articulate industry 
arguments. 
A range of data sources and data 
collection activities are described 
including those which capture political 
events.  The design and composition of 
the case study provides some 
conceptual framework for the data 
analysis.  
 
Other data sources may have 
enhanced the findings of the case 
study. The reports were heavily 
promoted and a key policy decision 
was controversially reversed, though 
the study is not able to directly link the 
two. The industry actor studied is part 
owned by a tobacco company and may 
be untypical of other actors. 
Katikireddi et al. 2014 
(37)* 
 
This case study investigated the 
development of pricing policy in Scotland 
and identifies two contrasting framings of 
the nature of the alcohol-related problems 
to be addressed, which dominate the 
underlying policy debate: ‘social disorder’ 
(promoted by some but not all industry 
actors) versus ‘health’.  This study thus 
emphasises the importance of framing in 
policy debates. 
Combines both interview and 
documentary data including textual 
and oral evidence to a parliamentary 
committee. Offers a sophisticated, 
theoretically based approach to data 
analysis with details provided of the 
process.   
The study does provide key data on 
industry actors though the scope is 
broader, so that there are limitations 
in the reporting of industry actor 
specific findings. Nonetheless, the 
study identifies a key difference in 
framing between industry actors 
supporting and opposing the policy 
measure. 
Kypri et al. 2014 (40) 
 
This is a documentary study of submissions 
to a New Zealand parliamentary committee 
on a proposed bill to increase the minimum 
purchase age for alcohol. Industry 
submissions were highly unified in their 
opposition to the bill in comparison to those 
from other sources. Industry actors sought 
to increase the numbers of submissions 
opposing the bill. 
A large dataset of 178 submissions, 
mostly from the public, industry and 
NGOs was included. Template/ 
thematic analysis was used with 
doubled coding of data and detailed 
presentation of findings based on 
coding.   
The bulk of the alcohol industry data is 
quantitative rather than qualitative. 
The scope of this study is largely 
concerned with comparisons between 
submissions from different types of 
actors rather than on the industry per 
se.    
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Sornpaisarn &  
Kaewmungkun 2014 
(29) 
 
This case study examines taxation by 
beverage category in Thailand over a 20 year 
period and efforts by the three dominant 
alcohol companies to influence decision-
making in line with their interests. The tax 
regime favoured the largest company and 
the other two used donations and access to 
prominent politicians, including the Prime 
Minister, to lobby for policy change. 
Conflicts between sectoral interests are 
emphasised. 
Multiple data sources used include 
quantitative analyses of taxation data, 
participant observations, media 
reports and parliamentary documents. 
Two specific events in the policy 
process are described. Content 
analyses performed with triangulation 
between data sources is described. 
There are few qualitative data 
originating from the content analyses 
presented, and it is not clear how data 
from different sources were used in 
reaching conclusions. The quantitative 
data do not include imports. It is not 
clear how informative events, other 
than the two described, may be. 
Avery et al. 2016 (41) 
 
This documentary study of alcohol industry 
submissions to an Australian parliamentary 
inquiry into fetal alcohol spectrum disorders 
sought to investigate how industry actors 
contribute to policy development. As in 
other studies, it found promotion of vested 
interests including advocacy of ineffective 
policies, problem minimization, and attacks 
on opponents. 
This study examines a small dataset of 
5 submissions made by 4 national and 
one state level (Western Australia) 
trade association covering the main 
sectors of alcohol production. 
Thematic analytic methods are used, 
though not described in detail. 
There appears little depth to the data 
available from industry actors. 
Generalisability to other issues, actors 
and cultures could be limited, though 
the findings are similar to those of 
other studies. 
Zatonski et al. 2016 
(30) 
This documentary study examined framing 
of the policy debate around an increase in 
spirits tax in Poland. Industry actors 
successfully promoted an economic framing 
of the policy debate in opposition to a health 
frame, especially in newspapers. 
 
 
This study adds to the literature on the 
importance of framing, and discursive 
strategies more broadly, in alcohol 
policy debates.  Identifies precisely all 
dates and data sources (print media, 
spirits industry websites, 
governmental records and 
parliamentary debates) and 155 
documents on the spirits tax were 
included.  Theoretically informed 
analyses of framing, content analysis 
before thematic, with origins and 
Doesn’t present search terms or 
strategy. Included data somewhat 
lacking in depth. Limited coverage of 
included data sources e.g. no online 
media. 
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outcomes of codes presented. First 
author conducted analyses. 
Savell et al. 2016 (13) 
 
This study sought to systematically review 
alcohol industry attempts to influence 
alcohol policies on marketing. Key 
arguments synthesised across 17 reports 
emphasized industry self-regulation and 
individual drinker responsibility. Strong 
commonalities between tobacco and alcohol 
industry political activities were identified, 
with variations most likely due to policy 
context. This first evidence synthesis 
provides a major milestone in the 
development of the literature on alcohol 
industry policy influencing strategies.  
 
 
The 17 reports involve different forms 
of evidence and only 2/17 reports are 
included within the present study due 
to differing foci and study designs (for 
example, grey literature is excluded 
here). A rigorous narrative synthesis of 
included reports is described with 
findings also reported in detail. This 
included involvement of all 3 authors 
in analysis, and double coding of all 
data. A careful comparison of findings 
with those from a parallel review on 
the tobacco industry was also 
undertaken.  
The report is not reported according to 
PRISMA guidelines and required 
content is lacking.  Potentially eligible 
reports may have been missed. The 
evidential strengths and limitations of 
individual reports, and the literature as 
a whole, have not been explicitly 
discussed. 
 
* Other reports from these studies did not fulfil eligibility criteria for this review for lack of sufficient industry actor study focus or data 
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Table 2: Policy framing strategies 
Object of 
Framing  
 
Strategy 
Policy Actors 
Position themselves as key stakeholders in the policy-making process and partners in tackling alcohol harms (13, 26, 33, 38, 39) 
Position themselves as key economic actors; i.e. generators of tax revenue/ employment (13, 23, 28, 30, 32, 34) 
Claim they are responsible actors, unfairly demonized by public health actors and policy makers (13, 26, 27, 34) 
 Emphasise that they are  a legal industry (13, 26, 34) 
 Differentiate themselves from the tobacco industry (13) 
Present public health actors as extremists (or neo-prohibitionists) driven by a moral agenda in order to undermine their 
credibility and policy influence (23-25, 41) 
 
 
The Policy 
Play down the scale of alcohol problems (and thus the need for policy interventions) (13, 22, 24, 26-28, 30, 32, 34, 37-39, 41) 
 frame the alcohol problem in terms of a small minority of problem drinkers versus the moderate majority who are 
already aware of the need to drink responsibly (13, 22, 24, 27, 32, 34, 37, 39, 41) 
 emphasise positive effects of alcohol; e.g. social and health benefits of ‘moderate’ drinking (13, 26, 28, 30, 34) 
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Problem 
 
 focus policy debates on narrow range of harms, issues and sub-populations; i.e. binge and youth drinking; drink driving; 
drinking in pregnancy; certain areas of the country (24, 26, 32, 34, 37, 38) 
Promote individualized accounts of the nature of alcohol problems (13, 23, 24, 26-28, 32, 34, 37-40) 
 consumer behaviour (misuse), not the product, is the source of harm (13, 24, 34, 40) 
 it is unfair to penalise the majority for the actions of the few (24, 27, 28, 34, 39) 
Present alcohol and ‘responsible’ drinking as socially acceptable, whilst alcohol misuse should be socially unacceptable (22, 24, 
26, 34, 37, 39) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy 
Positions 
Oppose the whole population approach and specific measures derived from it; argue they are ineffective, ‘blunt instruments’ 
which fail to address the real policy problems and have unintended negative consequences (13, 27, 34, 37, 39, 41) 
Oppose: 
 minimum unit pricing (UK); argued it is ineffective, illegal and counterproductive; and that it unfairly targets moderate 
and less wealthy drinkers (32, 34, 37-40) 
 tax increases (except as a ‘less bad’ alternative to MUP) (24, 25, 28-32, 34) 
 advertising, marketing and sponsorship restrictions (13, 22, 24, 27, 31) 
 mandatory product labelling regimes (24, 25, 41) 
 reductions in blood alcohol levels in drink-driving laws (24) 
 increases in minimum purchase age (40) 
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Promote targeted interventions (as direct alternatives to whole population intervention) e.g. on parenting style (13, 23, 24, 26, 
27, 32, 34, 37-40) 
Promote voluntary, co-regulatory and self-regulatory initiatives and partnerships (as direct alternatives to mandatory regimes) 
(13, 22, 24-27, 34, 41)  
 for public information and education including product labelling (13, 22, 24, 26, 27, 34, 41)  
 for advertising and marketing codes (13, 22) 
Promote better enforcement of existing laws (i.e. underage sales and drink driving) as opposed to passing new laws (13, 24, 26, 
34, 39, 41) 
Promote the ideal of evidence based policy, but use evidence selectively to support their policy preferences (13, 22, 24, 26-28, 
34, 37-40) 
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Table 3: Policy influencing strategies 
 Strategy 
 Adopt multiple 
organizational forms 
Proceed unilaterally: Individual companies lobby government and 
other policy actors directly; mainly limited to large companies with 
sufficient access and resources (13, 26, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39, 40) 
Pursue traditional forms of collective action: Form, and participate in, 
trade associations and develop other forms of collective interest 
representation (13, 22-24, 30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39-41) 
Create novel forms of collective action: use social aspects 
organisations and ad hoc campaign groups to give the impression of 
independence and as additional channels of influence to (13, 27, 33, 
38, 39) 
 speak publicly and to government with industry framing; 
 disseminate research and produce reports to promote 
industry favourable messages; 
 deliver public information campaigns; 
 implement self-regulatory regimes (e.g. Portman Group on 
advertising). 
Use external  agencies (33, 38) 
 media and public relations consultancies used to shape terms 
of policy debates; 
 consultancies used to produce reports on policy issues;  
 funding think tanks creates the perception of independent 
authority;   
 
Engaging Policy Actors 
Long-term relationship building with key decision makers via regular 
formal and informal contacts including creating reciprocal obligations 
(13, 23, 26, 28, 32, 33, 41)  
 financial contributions to political parties/ campaigns (13, 23) 
 personal contacts and informal networks between industry 
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actors and other policy actors (23, 33) 
 providing government with ‘policy goods’; e.g. information, 
expertise, and policy delivery via self- regulatory regimes 
(individually and via trade associations and social aspects 
organisations) (13, 22, 33, 41)  
Short term issue specific campaigns in response to events (13, 23, 28-
33, 37, 38) 
 adapt strategies pragmatically to the policy context (23, 32, 
33) 
 venue shifting (e.g. Edinburgh to Westminster) (32, 33) 
 legal challenges (13, 32) 
Fund or disseminate policy relevant research with supportive findings 
to create a separate, circumscribed & self-referential literature using 
think tanks, academics, consultancies and similar policy actors (13, 27, 
29, 38, 39)  
Constituency building with influential policy actors (22-25, 28, 31-33) 
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Table 4: Effects on policy outcomes  
Study Availability of data and content of findings  
 
Giesbrecht et al. 
2004 (22); 
Greenfield et al. 
2004 (23) 
 
Examined a wide range of issues in US alcohol policy throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, with most detailed data available on the effects on advertising 
and product labelling policy outcomes. Initial success by public health actors 
to enact legislation on health warning labels on alcohol products was 
gradually countered by industry efforts to include labelling content 
promoting the health benefits of alcohol. Broadcast and alcohol industry 
groups ran TV public-awareness campaigns as voluntary alternatives to 
legislation as part of a package that led to proposals for mandatory 
regulations being withdrawn. A voluntary ban on spirits advertising was 
maintained, again avoiding legislative restrictions. The opposition of public 
health and industry actors make alcohol policy development widely 
recognised as challenging, with the consequence of inhibiting the 
development of new policies, apart from in windows of opportunity.   
Bond et al. 2009(24); 
Bond et al. 2010(25) 
 
No data as not part of study design. 
Bakke & Endal 2010 
(26) 
 
An alcohol company was identified to be responsible for the creation of the 
original drafts of national alcohol policy documents in 4 African countries. 
The contents of the final policies in these countries were not studied to 
provide direct evidence of impacts on policy decision-making. 
 
Miller  et al. 2011 
(27) 
 
No data as not part of study design. 
Yoon & Lam 2012 
(28) 
 
Despite strong support for economic liberalism, and vigorous lobbying by 
alcohol industry actors, the Hong Kong government was initially resistant to 
calls to reduce alcohol tax as this was seen as a an important source of 
revenue. Gradually, over the 8 year period of study, continued industry 
lobbying, in the face of relatively weak public health advocacy, led to a 
change in policy with Hong Kong going from a relatively high tax rate to zero 
duties on wine and beer.  
 
Holden et al.  2012 
(35); Holden and 
Hawkins 2012 (32); 
Hawkins & Holden 
2013 (34);  
Hawkins & Holden 
2014 (33) 
 
Extensive access to policy making in the UK Government system, supported 
by framing activities to promote themselves as partners in alcohol policy, has 
led to a situation in which industry actors are widely accepted as legitimate 
actors in the policy process, well positioned to obtain favourable policy 
outcomes. Following devolution within the UK, the election of a new party of 
government, disrupted the equilibrium previously pertaining to alcohol 
policy in Scotland. This led to legislation on alcohol minimum unit pricing, 
despite extensive industry opposition. Public health actors were better able 
to gain access to policy making in Scotland than they had been at the UK 
level, where the privileged access possessed by industry actors was 
maintained. 
 
Jiang and Ling 2013 
(31) 
 
Coalitions of tobacco and alcohol industry actors, particularly where shaped 
by instances of shared ownership, have had a numbers of successes in 
influencing tobacco control policy in the US. No data are provided on alcohol 
  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
policies. 
 
McCambridge et al.  
2013 (39) 
 
The alcohol industry submissions to a public consultation on alcohol policy 
examined in this study constituted one strand of industry strategies to 
influence alcohol policy in Scotland that were ultimately unsuccessful, as 
described elsewhere in this table.  
 
Hawkins & 
McCambridge 2014 
(38) 
 
This study examined the contribution of a global alcohol producer’s 
partnership with a think tank to the reversal of a policy decision on alcohol 
minimum unit pricing in England. Whilst not designed to draw strong 
conclusions, the study provides circumstantial evidence of industry influence 
on decision-making is provided. 
 
Katikireddi et al. 
2014 (37) 
 
Framing by public health actors in support of alcohol minimum unit pricing 
was more successful than that used by industry actors in opposing the policy 
in Scotland (see also above).  
 
Kypri et al. 2014 (40) No data as not part of study design. 
Sornpaisarn &  
Kaewmungkun 2014 
(29) 
 
This study principally examines competition between three companies in 
influencing policy in an oligopolistic alcohol industry. The largest company 
was favoured by the taxation regime and largely succeeded in preventing the 
policy changes sought by the other two companies. 
  
 
Avery et al. 2016 
(41) 
 
A parliamentary enquiry recommended the inclusion of mandatory warning 
labels on all alcohol products against the preferences of industry actors. This 
did not translate into government policy, which continued instead with the 
existing voluntary labelling regime among other industry-favoured measures 
on fetal alcohol spectrum disorders.  
Zatonski et al. 2016 
(30) 
The public debate on alcohol policy in Poland was dominated by the views of 
the alcohol industry and other opponents of a spirits tax increase. Despite 
this, the tax was implemented, although the Government conceded that the 
spirits excise tax would not be increased again within the next two years. 
Savell et al. 2016 
(13) 
No data as not part of study design. 
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Figure 1: Prisma flowchart 
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